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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shirley Stone-Jones appeals in Docket No. 41513 from the judgment and
sentence

entered

upon

her

conditional

guilty

plea

to

possession

of

methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, with a habitual drug offender
enhancement.

She appeals in Docket No. 41607 from the judgment and

sentences entered upon her guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and
forgery. The cases have been consolidated on appeal.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings In Docket No. 41513
On May 2, 2012, Boise City Police Officer Jim Cromwell received a tip
from a known informant that "Stone-Jones was carrying some narcotics on her
and was on her way to the Home Depot in Meridian .... to buy some more."
(4/29/13 Tr., p.78, L.21 - p.79, L.4, p.81, L.7 - p.82, L.1.) According to the
informant, Stone-Jones was travelling to the Meridian Home Depot from her
house on O'Farrell Street in Boise in a black Chevy Blazer. (4/29/13 Tr., p.82,
Ls.2-10.) At the time Officer Cromwell received the tip, he was aware that, just a
few days earlier, Stone-Jones and the informant had been pulled over in Valley
County and, as a result of that stop, Stone-Jones had been arrested for
possessing methamphetamine. (4/29/13 Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.81, L.6.)
Acting on the information received from the informant, Officer Cromwell
asked other officers to assist him in locating Stone-Jones.

(4/29/13 Tr., p.82,

L.19 - p.83, L.6.) An undercover narcotics officer, Terry Phillips, went to StoneJones' residence on O'Farrell Street but did not see a black Chevy Blazer there.

1

(4/23/13 Tr., p.102, L.8 - p.105, L.5.) Officer Phillips then drove to the Home
Depot store in Meridian. (4/23/13 Tr., p.105, Ls.6-17.) Once there, the officer
saw the Chevy Blazer in a nearby Shari's parking lot. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13
Tr., p.105, L.18 - p.106, L.6.)

After watching the Blazer for a few minutes,

Officer Phillips saw Stone-Jones exit the Blazer from the front passenger side
and get into the passenger side of a green Toyota Tercel that had just pulled up.
(4/23/13 Tr., p.106, L.6 - p.107, L.1.) For the next several minutes, the Tercel
made two or three circles around the parking lot of the shopping complex in
which the Home Depot and Shari's were located.

(4/23/13 Tr., p.107, L.20 -

p.108, L.11.) The Tercel then pulled back into the Shari's parking lot where the
Blazer was still parked.

(4/23/13 Tr., p.107, Ls.16-19, p.108, Ls.1-3.) At that

point, Stone-Jones got out of the Tercel and got back into the Blazer. (4/23/13
Tr., p.108, Ls.1-3.) The Blazer then left the parking lot and got on the eastbound
freeway, headed toward Boise. (4/23/13 Tr., p.108, Ls.3-16.)
Officer Phillips followed the Blazer from the Shari's parking lot to a
residence on Gowen Road, where the Blazer stayed for 10 to 15 minutes.
(#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p. 108, L.12 - p.109, L.5.)

After leaving the

Gowen Road residence, the Blazer got back on the freeway, headed toward the
inbound connector. (4/23/13 Tr., p.109, Ls.6-10.) The officer again followed the
Blazer and observed the driver commit multiple traffic infractions. (#41513 R.,
p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p.109, L.17 - p.111, L.11.)

Officer Phillips relayed his

observations to Officer Cromwell, who then started following the Blazer in a
marked patrol car. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p.109, Ls.11-16, p.111, L.11
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- p.112, L.6, p.112, L.25 - p.113, L.3; 4/29/13 Tr., p.84, Ls.3-13.)

After

observing the driver of the Blazer commit another traffic infraction, Officer
Cromwell effectuated a traffic stop. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p.112, Ls.710; 4/29/13 Tr., p.84, L.14 - p.85, L.5, p.121, Ls.1-21.)

Boise Police Officer

Steven Martinez and K-9 Officer Kelly Montoya also responded and assisted with
the stop. (#41513 R., pp.135-36; 4/23/13 Tr., p.76, L.22-p.77, L.5, p.112, L.18
- p.113, L.7; 4/29/13 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.12, p.50, L.22 - p.51, L.15, p.61,
Ls.13-16, p.121, L.22-p.122, L.4.)
Officer Cromwell approached the Blazer and made contact with the driver,
who was identified as Chris Mclellen. 1 (4/29/13 Tr., p.85, Ls.19-22.) Although
the temperature outside was only "in the 50s," Mclellen "had beads of sweat on
his forehead" and his head and hands were shaking, "almost like tremors."
(#41513 R., pp.135-36; 4/29/13 Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.86, L.14.)

Suspecting

Mclellen might be under the influence of methamphetamine or some other
stimulant, Officer Cromwell called for assistance from Officer Robert Gibson, a
"night STEP officer[] who specializes in DUls." (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr.,
p.86, L.15 - p.87, L.21, p.89, L.6 - p.90, L.16, p.91, Ls.17-20.) Before Officer
Gibson arrived, Officer Cromwell asked Mclellen to step out of the vehicle.
(4/29/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.21-25.) As Mclellen stepped out of the Blazer, Officer

1

Mclellen's name is spelled differently at various parts of the record and
transcripts. For purposes of this brief, the state adopts the spelling that, as
noted by defense counsel below, appears in the police reports pertaining the
May 2, 2012 traffic stop. (See 4/23/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-24; PSI, pp.27-30.)
3

Cromwell observed a large bulge in Mclellen's pocket. (4/29/13 Tr., p.92, Ls.19.) Mclellen told the officer the bulge "was money." (4/29/13 Tr., p.92, Ls.1013.)

With Mclellen's permission, Officer Cromwell reached into Mclellen's

pocket and pulled out a roll of $1400.00 in cash, an amount the officer knew to
be consistent with the approximate price of one ounce of methamphetamine.
(4/29/13 Tr., p.92, L.14 - p.93, L.25.)
While Officer Cromwell was speaking to Mclellen, Officer Martinez
approached the passenger side of the Blazer, made contact with Stone-Jones,
and asked her to step out of the vehicle. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.9, L.3
- p.10, L.1.) Stone-Jones complied and exited the vehicle carrying her purse.
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.11, L.7.)
After Stone-Jones and Mclellen were both out of the vehicle, and while
officers were still waiting for DUI Officer Gibson to arrive, Officer Montoya walked
his drug detection dog, Jax, around the Blazer. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr.,
p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.13, p.52, L.12 - p.53, L.7, p.94, Ls.1-6.) Jax twice alerted
on the front bumper. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.53, Ls.8-14.) Officers
Montoya and Cromwell searched the interior of the Blazer but did not find any
drugs. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.53, Ls.15-19, p.94, Ls.16-25.)
Shortly after officers searched the Blazer, DUI Officer Gibson arrived on
scene and administered a number of field sobriety tests (FSTs) to Mclellen.
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/23/13 Tr., p.76, L.18 - p.84, L.14; 4/29/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.415.) Stone-Jones sat on the on the sidewalk curb while Mclellen performed the
FSTs.

(4/23/13 Tr., p.85, Ls.6-15.)

Ultimately, Officer Gibson determined
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Mclellen was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol and he had
Mclellen sit on the sidewalk curb, next to Stone-Jones.

(#41513 R., p.136;

4/23/13 Tr., p.84, L.15-p.85, L.15.)
. At approximately the same time Officer Gibson completed his DUI
investigation of Mclellen, Officer Cromwell asked Stone-Jones to step away
from the curb so he could speak to her. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.21, L.5
- p.22, L.16, p.95, L.15 - p.96, L.11.)

As Stone-Jones stood up, the officer

noted she still had her purse with her, and it appeared to the officer to be full.
(4/29/13 Tr., p.96, L.17 - p.97, L.14.) Concerned that the purse might contain a
weapon, Officer Cromwell gave Stone-Jones two options: either leave the purse
where she had been seated or allow the officer to search the purse for weapons.
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.97, L.15 - p.98, L.15.) Stone-Jones opted to
leave the purse behind while she talked to the officer, and she told Mclellen to
"babysit" it for her. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.22, L.17 - p.24, L.19, p.99,
Ls.12-22, p.100, Ls.4-14.)
While Officer Cromwell was speaking to Stone-Jones, Officer Montoya
had Jax conduct an area sniff of the sidewalk where Mclellen and Stone-Jones'
purse were sitting. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.54, L.18 - p.55, LS.) Jax
alerted on the purse, which was sitting on the ground.

(#41513 R., p.136;

4/29/13 Tr., p.54, L.18 - p.55, L.1, p.56, L.16 - p.57, L.10.) Officer Cromwell
thereafter asked Stone-Jones for consent to search the purse, but Stone-Jones
declined. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.101, L.12 - p.102, L.4.) The officer
then explained to Stone-Jones that she could either consent to a search of her

5

purse or the officers would seize the purse and apply for a search warrant.
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.102, L.5 - p.103, L.21.) Stone-Jones chose
the latter option and told Officer Cromwell to "just take" the purse. (#41513 R.,
p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.103, Ls.22-24.)

The detention ended at that point and

Stone-Jones and Mclellen left in Mclellen's vehicle. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13
Tr., p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.16.)
The next day, Officer Cromwell applied for and obtained a warrant to
search Stone-Jones' purse. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.104, L.17-p.105,
L.24.)

The officer searched the purse and found several baggies of

methamphetamine, scales, cash, a "pay/owe" sheet, and drug paraphernalia.
(#41513 R., pp.136-37; 4/29/13 Tr., p.105, L.25-p.106, L.24; PSI, p.33 2 .)
The state charged Stone-Jones with possession of methamphetamine
with the intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a habitual drug
offender enhancement.

(#41513 R., pp.38-39, 53-54, 147-50.)

Stone-Jones

filed a motion to suppress, arguing, inter a/ia, that the evidence against her was
the fruit of an unlawfully extended traffic stop.

(#41513 R., pp.65-78.)

The

district court denied the motion, ruling the length of the stop was constitutionally
reasonable.

(#41513 R., pp.135-42.)

Stone-Jones thereafter entered a

conditional guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver
and being a habitual drug offender, specifically reserving the right to appeal the
denial of her suppression motion.

(#41513 R., pp.151-59.) The district court

2

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file
"Stone-JonesPSI. pdf."
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accepted Stone-Jones' plea and imposed a unified sentence of 25 years, with
three years fixed.

(#41513 R., pp.170-74.)

Stone-Jones timely appealed.

(#41513 R., pp.178-81.)

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings in Docket 41607
While Stone-Jones was out on bond in Docket 41513, officers executed a
search warrant at her residence and found in her bedroom a cache of
contraband that included methamphetamine, glass pipes, used syringes, glass
vials, zip lock baggies, a digital scale, several color copies of a $100 bill, and a
computer and printer, on top of which was a counterfeit $100 bill. (PSI, pp.4-5,
53,

56-57.)

The

state

charged

Stone-Jones

with

possession

of

methamphetamine, forgery, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a habitual
drug offender enhancement. (#41607 R., pp.28-29, 37-38.) Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Stone-Jones pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine and
forgery, and the state dismissed the paraphernalia charge and the enhancement.
(#41607 R., p.67; 8/15/13 Tr., p.5, L.9-p.28, L.1.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of seven years, with four years fixed, on the possession count,
and a concurrent unified sentence of 14 years, with four years fixed, on the
forgery count, and it ordered the sentences to run concurrently with Stone-Jones'
sentence in Docket 41513.

(#41607 R., pp.70-74.)

appealed. (#41607 R., pp.78-80.)
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Stone-Jones timely

ISSUES
Stone-Jones states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Stone-Jones's
motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed
concurrent, unified sentences of twenty-five years, with three
years fixed; seven years, with four years fixed; and fourteen
years, with four years fixed, following Ms. Stone-Jones's
pleas of guilty to possession of a controlled substance with
the intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance,
and forgery?

(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Stone-Jones failed to show error in the denial of her motion to
suppress?

2.

Has Stone-Jones failed to show her sentences are excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
Stone-Jones Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Stone-Jones challenges the denial of her suppression motion in Docket

No. 41513, arguing as she did below that the evidence against her was the fruit
of an unlawfully prolonged detention. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-15.) Stone-Jones'
argument fails. Correct application of the law to the undisputed facts supports
the district court's determination that the

length of the detention was

constitutionally reasonable.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810,
203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16,
19 (2007).

C.

The Length Of The Detention Was Constitutionally Reasonable
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative

detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App.
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2008) (citations omitted).

Under Terry, an investigative detention must be

supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underway.
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991).

The

"reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or
has been involved in criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408,
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951.
Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is
determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Van Dorne,
139 Idaho 961,964, 88 P.3d 780,783 (Ct. App. 2004).
"An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496,
198 P.3d at 134 (citations omitted). ''There is no rigid time limit for determining
when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider
the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as
well as the duration of the stop."

&

The court must also consider whether the

officer's observations during the encounter "and events succeeding the stop"
gave rise to "legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further
investigation" which justified expanding the investigation to other possible crimes.

&; see also State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App.
2001).
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In this case, Stone-Jones does not challenge the constitutionality of the
initial traffic stop of the vehicle in which she was a passenger, the search of the
vehicle following the alert by the drug dog, or the DUI investigation of the driver,
Chris Mclellen.

(See generally Appellant's brief, pp.9-15.)

She contends,

however, that once Mclellen passed the FSTs,
the purpose of the stop was accomplished. At that point, Officer
Cromwell should have let them both go. Instead, his questioning,
and Jax's dog sniff [of Stone-Jones' purse], impermissibly extended
the detention. The drug investigation was over once the vehicle
had been searched. The DUI investigation was over once Mr.
McQuellan [sic] passed the field sobriety tests. At that point, any
further questioning was unconstitutional.
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) Stone-Jones' argument is without merit. Despite her
conclusory assertions to the contrary, the undisputed facts of this case show
that, even after the vehicle was searched and Mclellen passed the FSTs,
officers continued to have an objectively reasonable basis to suspect StoneJones and Mclellen were involved in illegal drug activity. That officers continued
to investigate that possible illegal activity by briefly questioning Stone-Jones and,
at the same time, having the drug dog sniff the area where Stone-Jones left her
purse, did not unlawfully extend the detention. See Grantham, 146 Idaho at 49697, 198 P.3d at 134-35 (officer justified in expanding scope of traffic stop where
occupants of vehicle exhibited physical signs of methamphetamine use);
Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 917, 42 P.3d at 710 (lengthening of traffic stop to wait for
arrival of drug dog not unlawful where officers had reasonable suspicion of drug
crime).
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It is undisputed that officers stopped the vehicle in which Stone-Jones
was a passenger after: (1) learning from another law enforcement agent that
Stone-Jones had recently been arrested for possessing methamphetamine
(4/29/13 Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.81, L.6); (2) receiving information from a known
informant that Stone-Jones would be involved in illegal narcotics activity at the
Home Depot in Meridian that evening (4/29/13 Tr., p.78, L.21 - p.79, L.4, p.81,

L. 7 - p.82, L.1 O); (3) observing Stone-Jones and the driver of the vehicle engage
in suspicious activity in the parking lot of the complex in which the Home Depot
was located (#41513 R., p.135); and (4) observing the driver of the vehicle
commit multiple traffic infractions (#41513 R., p.135). Considered in their totality,
these facts were alone sufficient to supply the officers with reasonable suspicion
that Stone-Jones and Mclellen may be involved in illegal drug activity.

See

State v. Widner, 155 Idaho 840, 317 P.3d 737 (Ct. App. 2013) (review denied)
(traffic stop based on suspicion of illegal drug activity justified where officers
knew defendant had previously sold marijuana, received a tip that defendant
would be traveling at a particular time and place in a particular vehicle to
purchase more marijuana, and independently verified some of the details of the
tip). That suspicion was only heightened when, during the traffic stop, Mclellen
displayed physical signs - sweating and tremors - that led officer Cromwell to
suspect he was under the influence of methamphetamine or some other
stimulant. (#41513 R., pp.135-36; 4/29/13 Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.87, L.21.) Also
adding to the suspicion of illegal drug activity were the facts that a drug dog
alerted on the exterior of the vehicle and Mclellen had in his possession a "roll"

12

of $1400.00 cash - an amount Officer Cromwell knew from his training and
experience to be the approximate price of one ounce of methamphetamine.
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.92, L.14-p.93, L.25.)
Considered in their totality, the above facts clearly gave the officers
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop for the purpose of
investigating whether Stone-Jones and Mclellen were involved in drug-related
activities. Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496-97, 198 P.3d at 134-35; Brumfield, 136
Idaho at 917, 42 P.3d at 710. Stone-Jones appears to concede this point but
argues that, once the officers searched the vehicle and found no drugs in it,
"[t]he drug investigation was over."

(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

Stone-Jones is

incorrect. While the absence of drugs in the vehicle following the dog alert is
certainly a factor to consider in determining whether officers were justified in
continuing their investigation, that fact alone does not overcome the other
information that gave officers reason to suspect that Stone-Jones and Mclellen
might not only possess and/or be using drugs, but might also have recently
bought and/or sold drugs as well. Compare State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703,
302 P.3d 328 (2012) (probable cause established by dog alert on exterior of
vehicle did not dissipate merely because dog did not also alert inside the vehicle
where additional circumstances known to officers added to the probable cause
determination).
Again, before they even effectuated the traffic stop, officers in this case
knew

that

Stone-Jones

had

recently

been

arrested

for

possessing

methamphetamine, and they had received a tip that Stone-Jones would be
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engaging in a drug transaction in the parking lot of the Meridian Home Depot that
evening.

(#41513 R., p.135; 4/29/13 Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.82, L.10.) An officer

independently corroborated the tip when he observed Stone-Jones and Mclellen
engage in suspicious activity in the Home Depot complex parking lot. (#41513
R., p.135.)

When Mclellen and Stone-Jones left the parking lot, the officer

followed them to a residence on Gowen Road, where they stayed for only 15
minutes before heading toward downtown Boise. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr.,
p.108, L.12 - p.109, L.10.) When officers did make contact with Stone-Jones
and Mclellen, a drug dog alerted on the vehicle and Mclellen had a "roll" of
$1400.00 cash in his pocket, an amount that happened to correspond with the
approximate price of one ounce of methamphetamine.

(#41513 R., p.136;

4/29/13 Tr., p.92, L.14 - p.93, L.25.) Collectively, these facts could reasonably
lead officers to suspect that Stone-Jones and Mclellen had engaged in an illegal
drug transaction at the Home Depot parking lot. This suspicion was not dispelled
merely because officers did not find any drugs in the vehicle. Indeed, given all
the circumstances, it was reasonable to suspect that Stone-Jones and Mclellen
sold any methamphetamine they had in the vehicle at either the Home Depot
parking lot or the Gowen Road residence, or, alternatively, that Stone-Jones was
concealing the methamphetamine in the purse she carried with her when she
exited the vehicle.

Either way, the information confronting the officers was

sufficient to supply them with reasonable suspicion justifying an extension of the
traffic stop for the purpose of continuing their drug investigation.
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The district court found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that
officers did not unjustifiably prolong the traffic stop by questioning Stone-Jones
and, at the same time, having the drug dog sniff the area where her purse was
located. This determination is supported by the record, which shows that the
information available to the officers before the traffic stop, combined with the
officers' observations, general inquiries, and events following the stop, gave rise
to legitimate reasons for further investigation into suspected drug activity.
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496-97, 198 P.3d at 134-35; Brumfield, 136 Idaho at
917, 42 P.3d at 710. Stone-Jones has failed to establish any basis for reversal
of the district court's order denying her motion to suppress.

11.
Stone-Jones Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
After Stone-Jones pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine with the

intent to deliver and a habitual drug offender enhancement in Docket 41513 and
to possessing methamphetamine and forgery in Docket 41607, the district court
imposed concurrent unified sentences of 25 years, with three years fixed; seven
years, with four years fixed; and 14 years, with four years fixed, respectively.
(#41513 R., pp.170-74; #41607 R., pp.70-74.)

Stone-Jones challenges her

sentences on appeal, arguing the district court did not "adequately consider[]"
several factors she claims are mitigating.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-23.)

The

record, however, supports the sentences imposed; Stone-Jones has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

kl

Stone-Jones Has Failed To Show Her Sentences Are Excessive Under
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

kl

"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."
Statev. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,834,264 P.3d 935,941 (2011) (quotations and
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
will make an independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest."

kl

Contrary to Stone-Jones' arguments on appeal, an examination of

the record in this case shows her sentences are eminently reasonable.
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Stone-Jones' criminal record spans over a decade and consists primarily
of drug, theft, and driving related offenses.

(PSI, pp.6-10, 347-49.)

Her

convictions in these consolidated cases - for possession of methamphetamine
with the intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine and forgery constituted her second, third and fourth felony convictions, with her first felony
conviction having also been for possessing methamphetamine, in 2003. (PSI,
pp.6, 9-10, 345-47.) She has misdemeanor convictions for fraud - insufficient
funds checks (two counts), petit theft ("Reduced from felony"), inattentive driving
(amended from reckless driving), failure to purchase a driver's license (two
counts); driving under the influence, failure to provide insurance (two counts),
operating an unregistered vehicle, providing false information to and officer,
public nuisance, and driving without privileges (three counts). (PSI, pp.7-9, 348.)
She

was

also

awaiting

sentencing

on

another

felony

possession

of

methamphetamine charge when she was sentenced in these cases. (PSI, p.9.)
While there is no question that Stone-Jones has substance abuse and
mental health issues that have contributed to her convictions, there is equally
little question that Stone-Jones has been afforded numerous opportunities for
treatment of those issues but has been unable achieve any sustained period of
sobriety or ability to conform her behavior to the law. (PSI, pp.6, 10, 15-22, 7584, 191-98, 353.)

She has been placed on probation numerous times, was

afforded the opportunities of both drug court and a rider, and has served a prison
sentence. (PSI, pp.6-10, 17-18, 22, 348.) Despite these prior legal sanctions,
and the rehabilitative programming associated with them, Stone-Jones has been

17

neither rehabilitated nor deterred from committing new crimes. Perhaps there is
no better evidence of this than the fact that, within a week of being arrested for
possessing methamphetamine in Valley County, Stone-Jones acted as the
middleman in a methamphetamine sale and was arrested in Docket 41513 for
possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and possessing drug
paraphernalia; just one month later, she was arrested in Docket 41607 after
officers searched her house and found, among other things, methamphetamine,
drug paraphernalia and counterfeit money. (PSI, pp.4-6, 9-10.) Given StoneJones' tenaciousness in continuing to engage in illegal drug and theft related
activities, even when already facing significant legal penalties, the district courts
acted well within their discretion in concluding that a substantial prison sentence
was not only warranted, but necessary both to protect society and to provide
Stone-Jones with any meaningful chance for long-term rehabilitation.
On appeal, Stone-Jones does not dispute any of the information in the
PSI or contend that the district courts failed apply the correct legal standards or
exercise reason in their sentencing decisions.

She argues, however, that the

courts failed to "adequately consider[]" several factors she deems mitigating,
including what she characterizes as her "incredibly abusive childhood," "longterm drug abuse" and "significant mental health issues," willingness to "help
herself' by engaging in treatment, and progress in therapy.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.15-23.) All of the factors Stone-Jones cites were before the courts at the time
of sentencing; that Stone-Jones believes the courts should have weighed this
information differently does not establish an abuse of discretion.
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Moreover,

although the judges in both cases indicated they were aware of and had
considered the mitigating and aggravating factors (see 9/19/13 Tr., p.222, L.23 p.232, L.6; 11/6/13 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16), the district court in Docket 41513
specifically articulated its consideration of the factors Stone-Jones identifies on
appeal and its reasons for not elevating those factors above the needs to protect
society and afford Stone-Jones a significant period of structured rehabilitation
(9/119/13 Tr., p.222, L.23 - p.235, L.22). Because the court's reasoning applies
equally to the sentencing determinations in both cases, the state hereby adopts
that reasoning, as set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing in
Docket 41513 (Appendix A), and submits based thereon that Stone-Jones has
failed to establish an abuse of the courts' sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgments and
sentences in Docket Nos. 41513 and 41607.
th

DATED this 24 day of July 2014.

Deputy Attorne~~~I
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03.4/lPI,!

1

up a lot of negative things about me, there are a

03:IIOP)I

C3:"8PM

2

lot of positive things about me, too. I -- I'm

03:IIOPM

1

statement to the Court. In this situation, again,
the Court certainly acknowledges the State's

03:-!SPM

3

very proud of myself. I am very proud of myself.

03:60?M

2
3

03:"8PM

4

I do not feel that I'm a menace. I am a

03:60PM

4

this case and the companion case currently

03:-!SPM

5

productive part of society. That Is all I have.

03:00PM

scheduled for sentencing In front of Judge

03:51PM

5
6

03:61PI.I

7

especially In my case, with the charge of
possession with the Intent to deliver.

03:48PM

6

D3:"8PM

7

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Counsel, before Inquiring If there Is

frustration and concern. Given the background of

Wetherell and the Issues that have been ra ised,

8

any legal cause as to why sentence could not be

03:51PM

8

9

Imposed, one question that I have had and

03:61PM

9

unfortunately the presentence materials don't do

oa:e1PM

10

much to address It: It appears at page nine of

03:51PM

11

information available to the Court, It does appear

the presentence materials near the bottom that

oo:01P11

12

that, in fact, Ms. Stone-Jones, although to some

Nonetheless, I am Inclined to agree to
some extent with Mr. Wollen that from the

there ls a pending felony possession of a

00,01""

13

extent supporting herself with the sale of

controlled substance charge out of Valley County.

03:51PM

14

controlled substances, prtmarlly was using the

In this situation, Is there any Information that

03:51PM

15

sale of controlled substances to support her

16
17
18

habit,

either the State or the defense has as to the

03:51PII

status of that case?

03:s,PU

MR. WOLLEN: I think I can speak to that,

03:s1P11

Judge Wetherell's case, and she has spoken with

03:51?11

the Valley County deputy prosecutor. It's my

03:51p11

19
20
21
22

understanding that there's going be an offer made

03:5,,,...

23

Your Honor. I've been In communication with

oo:s1P11

Ms. Reilly, who is the prosecutor In

03:ll1PM

Nonetheless, there Is significant
concern about that conduct on the part of the
Court, and also concern In this situation about
the prior record and the other Information that
this Court has considered in making Its sentencing
decision.
I'm not going to belabor the facts of

to have her plead guilty to simple possession of

0362PM

24

the case. There was a suppression hearing that

methamphetamlne in that case, and It would be a

03:l!2PM

25

was held. I think ample evidence has been offered

222
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1

concurrent sentence. I don't belleve they are

03:621'11

1 as to the background of the case, what happened in

2

seeking a great deal of time as far as fixed time

03:621'11

2

terms of the search that was conducted, Again, as

3

on her. But Ms. Stone-Jones has not been up to

03:62PM

3

Ms. Stone-Jones has noted, she was forthcoming

4

Valley County to even address the warrant at this

03;52PM

4

when confronted about her Involvement and what had

5

point, so she would have to handle that down the

O'J:S'lPM

5

happened there.

6

road .

She does have a prior record that,

03:52PM

6

7

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

03:52PM

7

candidly, ls concerning for the Court. Of

8

MS. LONGHURST: And, Judge, I just want to

03:l!2PM

8

partlrular concern Is the prior felony possession

9

clarify: That part of the plea agreement was I

03:112P1,1

9

of a controlled substance for which the case was

wouldn't pursue charges. That's not the same

03:112PM

10

disposed In December of 2003. There were also

03;!!2PM

11

thing , There were charges after she was released
and the purse was searched and when they arrested
her. There was methamphetamlne found. That Is
what that referred to, not the Valley County
matter.
MR. WOLLEN: And that was our understanding
as well, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Counsel,
then, with that clarification, Is there any legal
reasons as to why sentence could not be imposed?
MS. LONGHURST: No, sir.
MR. WOLLEN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: In this case, I have considered
the arguments by the State as well as the defense,
and I have certainly considered Ms. Stone-Jones'
Page 221
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03:62PM 13
03:52PM 14
03:52?11 15
03:112PM 16
03:"2PM 17
OUIPM 18
03:1!3PM 19
03:!l3PII 20
03:113PM 21
03:lt!PM 22
03:11.11'11 23
03;53f'l,I 24
03:5:IPM 25
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several misdemeanor charges Including at least
four DWPs and one DUI.
There were also a couple of other
felony matters that were dismissed. One In 2010
that Included six counts of forgery and one of
grand theft, and one In 2011 that Included a
charge of grand theft by receiving stolen
property.
And then we've also mentioned and
discussed the pending controlled substance charge
out of the state -- or out of Valley County, as
well.
Ms. Stone-Jones, to some extent, has
alluded to this In her statement to the Court
about her upbringing, and Mr. Wollen, too. An
12/17/2013 12 :03:30 PM

227

225
extremely troubl!ng upbringing. Sexually molested

03:ro?M

1
2

by her adoptive father to the point that at one

03 68PM

o:t63PM

3

time she took matters Into her own hands. And

03:56PM

03·53PM

4

when her stepfather approached her, actually

0353PM

5

pointed a pistol at him and at that point he

03 53PM

6

backed off In terms of that conduct, but then

03:~M

7 there were ongoing issues with physical and verbal

03:53PM

0353PM

'

8

03:SJPM

9

ro53PM

10

o3$.4"M

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

03$.<PM

21

has been alluded to. The son does have at least

22
23

some criminal record that does include theft~

o354PM

related offences, as I understand It.

o354PM

24

o354PM

25

o353PM

0353PM
0354PM
03<14PM

0354PM
o354PM
o354?M

oJ54PM
o304PM

0354PM

abuse thereafter.

1

03158PM

Among other things, Doctor Somkey noted

2

an extensive history of drug abuse, something

03:56?11

3
4

verbal abuse that she suffered at the hands of her

03:56PM

5

husband. In this situation, also noted a

Ms. Stone-Jones has not denied. The physical and

03:56PM

6

functional impairment as a result of the

03:56PM

7

antisocial personality disorder.

03:56PM

8

And In this situation, had also noted
treatment was available In the past for her

03:56PM

9

Ms. Stone-Jones became aggressive and struggled

03:68PM

10

with the Issues raised there in her upbringing.

0356PM

11

benefitted from them. And I think he Is referring

She turned to drugs, alcohol, and fighting. In

03·68Pl,I

here, among other things, to the therapeutic

this situation, she married In 1985. Her husband

03·68PM

12
13

community and some of the other programming that

was a biker. There were Issues of abuse In that

03116?M

14

Ms. Stone-Jones had received.

relationship, as well.

0356PM

15

It has been Indicated that

substance abuse issues but had -- she had not

Doctor Somkey concluded that
Ms. Stone-Jones Is a high risk to the public at

0356PM

16

biker, and her husband's criminal record Included

03.56PM

17

large and a high risk to engage in future general

a variety of charges Including one of attempted

03:57PM

18

violence. He describes her as Impulsive and

murder.

03:o/PM

19

Irresponsible, and concludes that she is most

0357PM

20

likely to continue In her violent, criminal, and

0357PM

21

substance abusing behavior especially without

03:57PM

22

treatment.

03:57PM

23

He recommended treatment for the PTSD

03571'11

24

through psychotropic medication and psychological

0357P1,1

25

counseling; she completes substance abuse

In this case, she was raped by another

She does have a son and a daughter, as

In this case, she has not held a steady
job since 2008, although apparently she Is a

226
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03:64PM

1

certified nurse's assistant or a registered

03:57PM

1 treatment; that she complete a cognitive thinking

0364PM

2

nurse's assistant, and did work for a time for the

03:5TPM

2

3

Idaho Nursing Home In -- at Grangeville, as I

03 57PM

3

disorder; and concluded that If she got treatment,

4
5

understand It.

03:5TPM

4

and as recommended, that her risk to the community

03:57PM

5

would be reduced.

03:04PM
03·54?M
03:54PM

As has been noted, she does have
significant mental health Issues, diagnosed with a

03:57PM

brain lesion, and also diagnosis, according to

03:57PM

her, that Include manic depression, post-traumatic

03:57PM

stress disorder, extreme anxiety, bipolar

03:57PM

disorder, elevated panic attacks, and agoraphobia.

03·66PM

6
7
8
9
10

program to deal with her antisocial personality

In terms of Ms. Stone-Jones' substance

Q3·55PM

6
7
8
9
10

03M?M

11

0356PM

12

presentence materials, there was a report from an

03:WM

11
12

0355PM

13

organization called the Riverfront -- Riverfront

03:!ISPM

13

035111'1.1

14

Community Center from May of 2010 where the

03:66PM

14

things, noted that she had attended Drug Court In

03.56PM

15

diagnosis there included chronic post-traumatic

03·56PM

15

Grangeville In 2002, though It was discharged and

stress disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia,

03:l!ll?M

18

went to prison. As Ms. Longhurst has noted, she

03:55PM

16
17

grief, early-onset dysthymla, polysubstance

03.66PM

17

was paroled for a time and sent back to prison to

03:55PM

18

dependence, and also a closed head Injury.

03:681'M

18

complete her sentence.

19

Nonetheless, Doctor Sombke had

03:54PM
03:55PM
03:55PM

03"65PM

0355PM

03:SWM

I

Actually, the Court noted that In the

0366PM

19
03:55PM 20
03;!58PM 21
03:58PM 22
03:58PM

abuse Issues, the conclusions were the involvement
with the numerous number of drugs, including
methamphetamlne, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and
other hallucinogens. The GAIN-I assessment
specifically diagnosed Ms. Stone-Jones with
amphetamine dependence and alcohol abuse.
And In this situation, among other

She also attended therapeutic community

03:55PM

20

performed a psychological evaluation at the order

03:55PM

21

of the Court, and his diagnosis was of amphetamine
dependence, post-traumatic stress disorder and
antlsoclal personality disorder. And In this

03:08PM

23

03:M?M

22
23
24

case, I have found his diagnosis to be of some

03:58PM

24

some extent this perhaps explains Mr. Wollen's

03:158PM

25

benefit in terms of my sentencing decision.

03:68PM

25

confusion by the comments In the presentence

03:5S?M
03:56PM

12/17/2013 12:03:30 PM
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at the South Boise Women's Correctional Center and
did obtain some follow-up treatment while on
parole In Grangevllle, as well.
One thing I did note, and I think to

I
I

229
03:MPM

03·118PII
0308PM

231

1 investigation, at pages 22 and 23 In the

04:01PM

2
3

investigator's comments and analysts. The

04:01PM

presentence investigator noted at page 22 that

04:01PM

3

1 consideration ts and must be protecting society.
2 If I do nothing else, I must ensure that society
is protected In the sentence that I impose.

04:01PM

4

o:t59PM

4 "Concerning the mental health and substance abuse
5 Issues It appears," and I am quoting here, "that

04:01PM

5

03!59PM

6

04:01PM

6

general and specific, and rehabllltatlon.

0<:01PM

7

candidly, this Is one of those cases where I think

04:01PM

8

all of those considerations play a part In my

04:01PM

9 sentencing decision.

OJ:59.PN

her needs could be met In the community with

031!9PM

7 Intensive treatment.•
My take on that comment Is that that
8

03·1!9PM

9

o:t~?M

oo511PM

was based upon the comments contained In the

10 evaluations themselves and that that was the

11
03:511?M 12
031liPM 13
oo:lSUPM 14
oo=- 15
oa59PM 16
ou•,,.. 17
oo59PM 18
oo:_ . , 19
• 03:59PM 20
03:!lBPM 21
001191'1.1

There are other considerations for the
Court that include punishment, deterrence, both

o.01Pu

10

conclusion that the evaluators had made as to the

04:01PM

11

rehabllitatlon Is a factor. However, the Court Is

avatlabllity or possibility of community treatment

o.·01?11

12
13

concerned by the fact that Ms. Stone-Jones has had

If obtained.

0401PM

I do believe and find that to be, In

04,01P1o1

fact, the recommendation of the presentence

04,01?11

Investigator that the presentence Investigator,

o.c:01"" 16
0401p1o1

quoting now, "Based on the level of assessed need

0401P1o1
0401PM

discussed above, that Ms. Stone-Jones would

o.02P11

benefit from participation In rehabllltatlon

o,,az?M

programs and/or prosocial activities during a

0<,02P,.

period of penal incarceration to address her

0402PM

current attitudes orientation and behaviors.

0<02PM

"This may also assist her in gaining

O<C2PM

the benefit of numerous treatment opportunities In

14 the community and has stlll not been able to
15 conform her conduct to what would be expected of

and specfflcally at page 23, and, again, I'm
and risk and other protective factors, and as

In this situation, I think

17

her. Although, for a time she was able to do so
In the state of Montana.

18
In this situation, again, I am troubled
19 by the conclusions by Doctor Somkey In his
20 psychological evaluation of the high risk of -- to
21 the public at large and to engage In future
22 general violence If, In fact, Ms. Stone-Jones does

23
24
25

not receive the treatment that she so obviously
needs. And, therefore, the Court feels that
protection of society, Indeed, Is a significant

230
1

the Insight she Is searching for and possibly help

2 hern -- I'm changing that now. That was a typo
3
4

there. She referred to Ms. Stone-Jones as a him,
not a her.

5

And, if fact, Counsel, If you don't

1 consideration, as well.

04:02PM

2

O.C:02PII

3

this offence, and the other Information available,

04·D2PM

4

certainly punishment Is a consideration, and as Is

5

deterrence, both general to individuals in general
and speclflcally to Ms. Stone-Jones herself.

04:02PM

appreciates the recommendation from the defense

object, I'm going to change that by

0<:02PM

7

lnterllneatlon, as well.

8

MS. LONGHURST: No objection.

04:02PM

8

9

MR. WOLLEN: No objection.

04:02PM

9

04:00PM

THE COURT: I'll go ahead and make that
change.

04:00PM

12

-- "to obtain the skills to begin
living a crime-free life In the future.•

Given her prior record, the nature of

6
7

04:02PM

6

10
11

04:00PM

232
04:02PII

Whlle the Court in this case
that probation be a consideration, the Court does

0<:02Pll

10
11
12

And for that reason, also does not feel that this

04:02PM

13

Is an appropriate case for a period of retained

IM:02PM
04:02PM

not feel based upon the Information available to
It that probation Is a viable option In this case.

O.C:OOPM

13
14

04:02PM

14 jurisdiction.

O.C:OOPM

15

what the presentence Investigator was saying Is

°' _,.

15

O<OOPM

16

t!nlt Ms. Stone-Jones Indeed would benefit from a

IM:03PII

04:00PM

O<:OOPM
O< :OOPM

O<:tx>PM
' O<:OOPM

04:00PM
0o1,00PM
0o1:wPM

04:00Pl,I
04:01PV

So the Court concludes that, In fact,

17 period of Incarceration In the penitentiary with
18 treatment, and that, In fact, It did not appear
19 the presentence Investigator, given all the
20 factors that I have mentioned and that were
21 mentioned In the presentence report, that
22 probation or treatment In the community would be
23 the appropriate option.
24
The Court In Imposing sentence Is
25 always guided by the Toohlll factors. Its primary

11 of 12 sheets

04:a:JPII
04:03PM

O,:a:JPII
04 :03PM

04:03PII
IM:031'11
o.:03?11

040:IPM
04:D:IPtl

16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
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Therefore, the Court In this case Is
going to enter a judgment of conviction as to the
charge of possession of a controlled substance
with the Intent to deliver. Considering the drug
enhancement and the maximum sentence avallable to
me, nonetheless, I am not going to, In this case,
impose a life term. I do not believe that would
be appropriate.
I do, though, feel that a significant
term would be appropriate with a reasonable period
of fixed time to allow Ms. Stone-Jones the
12/17/2013 12:03 :30 PM
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233
1
2

04 ·03PM

3

opportunity at rehabilitation while in a custodial
setting as recommended. And also to give her a
realistic opportunity for release Into the
community at some time in the future.
Therefore, a judgment of conviction
will enter. I will sentence Ms. Stone-Jones to
the custody of the Board of Correction for a term
of 25 years. The first three years of that
sentence will be fixed followed by 22 years
indeterminate.
By my calculations, Ms. Stone-Jones,
you have, indeed, been in custody for over,
actually, 15 months. I show a total of 459 days
that you have been in custody at one time or
another In this case. And I am going to give you
credit for that time toward the fixed portion of
your sentence.
I'm also, in this case, going to order
restitution as requested, there being no objection

04:0:JPM

O-C:03PM

o-4·03PM

4

04 03PM

5

04 .o;,PM

6

04 :0JPM

'

7

04 :0JPM

8

04:03PM

9

0403P1o1

10

04:03PM

11

0403PM

12

04:04PM

13
14
15
16
17
18

0.,04PM

19

0403PM
04'04PM

.,..04P ..
O<l .04PM
0404PM

°"°"""'

20

0404PM

21

04"1'""'

22
23
24
25

04·0IIPM

1

0404PM

.,...,..p.,
04 .04PM

from the defense. And the defense, in fact,
having stipulating to it In the amount of
$1,464.46, and the Court will enter a civil
judgment of restitution at this time accordingly.
I am going to recommend to the Board of
Corrections, Ms. Stone-Jones, that you do be

04:0SPM

1

of the appeal could be borne at state expense, as
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In this case, ma'am, again, I felt that
the penitentiary sentence, given the information
available to me, was the most appropriate course
and I have followed that. I have given you, with
the fixed portion I have Imposed In this case, an
opportunity to demonstrate an amenability to
release back into the community after a certain
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fixed period of time.
However, I have also Imposed a
12 significant indeterminate sentence in this case.
13 And If, in fact, you are unable to demonstrate an
14 amenability to release back Into the community,
15 you will be in custody for a very long time •
16
Regardless, ma'am, I hope you are able
17 to take advantage of the treatment and other
18 programming available to you. And if you are, and
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If at some point you do, in fact, get released
back into the community, I will go ahead and
hopefully not see you back in court again. Thank
you .
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
MR. WOLLEN: May we maintain the PSI, Your
Honor?
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considered for any and all forms of therapeutic
counseling that may be available to you while in
their custody.
Since you have already had the benefit
of the therapeutic community, I'm not going to
specifically recommend that program, but I wlll
leave It to the Board of Corrections as to which
form of counseling may or may not be the most
appropriate for you. I know you have indicated
that you believe it would be In the form of an
Individual counseling program as opposed to a
general or generic one.
In this situation, I am not going to
Impose any fine. And although candidly, I believe
that you have received a real benefit from the
representation of the public defender in this
case, I am also not going to order any public
defender reimbursement in light of the
penitentiary sentence that I have Imposed in this
case today.
I do need to advise you, ma'am, that
you do have the right to appeal this decision of
the Court. The appeal has to be filed within
42 days from the date the judgment enters. If you
are a needy person and cannot afford it, the cost
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THE COURT: Certainly.
(End of requested proceedings.)
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